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I. INTRODUCTION
It was Napoleon who said, "Policy is destiny." There are few
better examples of the direct link between the change-creating
influences of public policies on subsequent societal outcomes than
immigration policy. As with the early history of all nations of the
western hemisphere, mass immigration played a major role in
the acquisition of the population ~nd labor force of the United
States. The era of significance ranged from the colonial period up
to the early years of the twentieth century.
Beginning in 1914, and continuing for the ensuing fifty
years, however, immigration steadily declined and immigration
policy receded dramatically in terms of its importance. Without
warning or anticipation, the process reversed.~ itself again as the
result of seemingly incidental policy changes initiated in 1965.
The phenomenon of mass immigration was accidentally revived.
Since then, immigration levels have soared and, once more,
immigration policy has become a major factor in shaping the
nation's labor force and population.
Unlike the earlier era of mass immigration, the U.S.
economy in the mid-1960s was no longer in its adolescent stage of
development. Instead, it was a mature economy that was itself
in the throes of significant transformations of both its labor
demand and supply. The introduction and spread of automatic
control technologies, the intensity and scale of the military arms
race of the Cold War era, and the opening of the economy to
global competition collectively translated into a demand for a
more highly skilled and better educated workforce. Likewise, on
the supply side, the postwar baby boom generation was just
beginning to enter the labor force in record numbers while
changing social attitudes and political policies were seeking to
broaden economic opportunities for minorities and women. The
one thing the new economy did not need was an infusion of more
workers per se-especially if they were disproportionately
unskilled and poorly educated.
It was quickly apparent by the mid-1970s that the extant
immigration policy of the nation was completely out of step with
the nation's evolving economic and social trends. A drive to
reform immigration policy commenced. Despite findings by
impartial national commissions and by the academic research
community over the ensuing decades, these reform proposals
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have been regularly rebuffed. Immigration policy has been
captured by a coalition of special interest groups and
organizations who have their own selfishprivate agendas. They
have littleconcern whether their goals are consistent with the
national interest. As a result,immigration has become a rogue
politicalpolicy that has been allowed the luxury of functioning
without accountability for its economic and demographic
consequences. Reining-in immigration policy remains a national
imperative.
II. THE CONTEXT OF POLICY ASSESSMENT
Given the prominent role that immigration played in the
early history of the nation, it may seem surprising that the
subject is not mentioned anywhere in the U.S. Constitution. But
as its significance to the national well being was gradually
recognized, the fedetal government, in the late nineteenth
century, moved in to claim its exclusive authority to regulate all
aspects of immigration. 1 Thus, immigration policy must be
viewed for what ithas become: a purely discretionaryaction of
the U.S. government. It has the sole duty to set annual
admission levels, to establish admission categories, to specify
entry requirements, to order entry priorities, and to enforce the
restrictions it imposes. No citizen of a foreign country has a right
to reside, visit, enter, work, or seek refuge in the United States
simply because they desire to do so. They may only legally do so
with the expressed permission of our national government.
Accompanying such exclusive power to regulate is an implied
duty to design an immigration policythat conforms to the best
interests of the citizens of the United States.
It is true, of course, that a significant number of immigrants
in the post-1965 era have simply ignored the policy restrictions
altogether and have illegally entered or overstayed their visas.
Thus, immigration reform also includes the necessary means to
enforce the policies that ar~ put in place. The same special
interest groups that have opposed reforms of the legal
immigration and refugee systems have usually opposed allefforts
to strengthen enforcement measures.
1. See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Henderson v. Mayor of the City of
N. Y, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 276 (1876).
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Because immigration involves the movement of people rather
than of products, it is labor market consequences that are
ultimately at the heart of any effort to assess policy congruence
with the national interest.2 Although immigration is
fundamentally an economic issue, post-1965 events testify that
public policy has seldom been formed on this basis. Nonetheless,
immigrants must work to support themselves or they must be
supported by others who do. The key issues that emerge pertain
to what impact immigrants have on the size, composition, and
distribution of the nation's labor force, as well as the fiscal and
social costs it imposes on society for their support.
III. THE ACCIDENTAL ISSUE: MAss IMMIGRATION
The contemporary era of mass immigration can be dated to
the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965.3 That year, the
foreign-born population totaled only 4.4% of the U.S. population.4
It was the lowest percentage since data was first collected in the
pre-Civil War era. It is highly likely that it was the lowest
percentage in the history of the nation.
In the mid-1960s, the nation was prospering.
Unemployment was declining. There was n~ shortage of labor in
1965 that required an increase in immigration. Indeed, 1965 was
exactly the year that the post-war "baby boom" hit the labor
market. That year, one million more people turned eighteen
years old (the primary age entering the labor force to seek full-
time jobs). This high annual entry level of eighteen-year-olds
persisted for the next sixteen years. It was also during that year
that the equal employment opportunity provisions (Title VII) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 went into effect. The civil rights
legislation was primarily concerned with improving the economic
status of black Americans. It is ironic, therefore, that no racial
group has benefited less from or been more adversely affected by
what mass immigration has produced.
2. See VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., MAss IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST
ch. 7 (2d ed. 1996).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-235, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
4. See Jeffrey S. Passel, 30 Years of Immigration and U.S. Population Growth,
presented at the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Annual
Research Conference (Nov. 3, 1995).
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Indeed, a strong case can be made that the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1965 was primarily a manifestation of the
nation's civil rights agenda of that same era. This is because the
primary motivation for passing the legislation was to end the
overt discrimination embodied in the nation's immigration law,
which had been in effect since 1924. The national origin
admission created by the Immigration Act of 19245 blatantly
discriminated in favor of Western and Northern European
countries and disfavored immigration from Eastern and
Southern Europe. In conjunction with earlier legislation, it also
virtually prohibited immigration from Asian countries. Western
hemispheric immigration, however, was not numerically
restricted, so there were. obviously other issues than mere
ethnocentrism involved in the passage of the restrictive
legislation in 1924. These issues involved legitimate concerns
over the adverse economic effects of the mass immigration of the
preceding decades on wages, income, housing, education, and
unemployment on the nation's labor force and population.
Thus, the paramount goal of the Immigration Act of 1965
was to achieve a non~discriminatory immigration policy. The
reformers "were so incensed with the ethnocentrism of the laws
of the past that they spent virtually all of their energies seeking
to eliminate the country of origin provisions" and, as a
consequence, they "gave very little attention to the substance or
long-range implications of the policy that would replace them.',e
In a nutshell, this is the story of what has subsequently
transpired. The nation-changing ramifications of the
Immigration Act of 1965 (with its extended family-based
admission system and new refugee admission category) were not
foreseen by any of its proponents. In testimony prior to its
passage, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated, "The significance
of immigration for the United States now depends less on the
number than on the quality of the immigrants."7 Senator Edward
Kennedy (D-Mass), the floor manager of the bill in the Senate,
stated, "This bill is not concerned with increasing immigration to
this country, nor will it lower any of the high standards we apply
5. 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952).
6. DAVID s. NORTH & MARION F. HOUSTOUN, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 5 (1976).
7. Hearings on S. 1932 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of
the SenateComm. On the Judiciary, 88th Congo 2d Sess. (1964) (statement of Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State).
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in the selection of immigrants."8 Kennedy also said, "our cities
will not be flooded with a million immigrants annually," that "the
ethnic mix of this country will not be upset" and that the pending
bill "would not cause American workers to lose their jobs."g None
of these assurances has proved to be valid. Supposedly, these
assurances were made at that time because they would not be
desirable policy outcomes.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF POST-1965 IMMIGRATION
A. Population
The most obvious effect of the changes in immigration policy
that began in 1965 has been the significant increase in the size of
the foreign-born population. Since 1965, the foreign-born
population has risen from 4.4% to 9.7% of the population in 1997
(or about one of every ten people).l0 In absolute terms, the
foreign-born population has increased from 8.6 million people in
1965 to 25.8 million people in 1997.11 If an allowance is made for
the undercount of illegal immigrants in the official data, the
actual inflow has certainly exceeded a million people a year
throughout most of the 1980s and all of the 1990s to date.
Of even greater significance for the future than the
proportional and absolute size of the foreign-born population is
its influence on the growth rate of the nation's population. The
1990 Census revealed that the foreign-born accounted for thirty-
seven percent of the population growth in the decade of the
1980s. Given what has already transpired and what can be
anticipated for the few years remaining in the 1990s, the foreign-
born will account for an even greater percentage in the present
decade.
As for the future, studies of tbe projected influence of
immigration on the size of the U.S. population for the _next
century are staggering. Two relevant demographic studies have
8. 89 CONGo REC. S24,225 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
9. Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Congo 1-2 (1965) (statement of Edward M. Kennedy,
Senator).
10. See Dianne Schmidley & Herman A. Alvarado, The Foreign-Born Population in
the United States: March 1997 (Update), CURRENT POPULATION REP. P20 1998, at 507.
11. See id.
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been made-one by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the other
by the National Research Council (NRC). Using both of their
"intermediate projections" of the effectsof immigration (i.e.,an
annual entry of 820,000 immigrants through to the year 2050,
which is the closest of their estimates to the annual level that is
actually occurring), they project that the 1995 population of 263
million persons will increase to 387 million persons (NRC)12 or
394 million persons (Census Bureau) by 2050.13 Of this aggregate
..
growth of from 124 to 131 million people (depending which
projection is used), both organizations agree that two-thirds of
the total growth, or approximately 80 million people, will be the
consequence of the immigrants themselves and of their future
children who will be born in this country.14 In the summary
words of the NRC study, "Immigration, then, will obviously play
the dominant role in our future population growth.,,15
B. Ethnic Composition
As was true during the earlier years when the national
origins system was in existence, the post-1965 contemporary
mass immigration is also extremely unbalanced in terms of its
ethnic composition. As of 1997, twenty-seven percent of the
entire national foreign-born population are immigrants from only
one country-Mexico. 16 Over half of the entire foreign-born
population of the United States in 1997 came from Latin
America. 17 Likewise, twenty-seven percent of the foreign-born
population came from Asian countries. 18 Indeed, ninety-two
percent of the total Asian foreign-born population in 1997
entered the United States since 1970.19 Europe and Africa, the
two continents that supplied virtually all of the immigrants of
12. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC,
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS 9F IMMIGRATION 95, tbl. 3.3 (James P. Smith &
BarryEdmonston eds., 1997).
13. See Jennifer Cheeseman Day, Population Projections of the United States by Age,
Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, CURRENT POPULATION REp. P25-1l30,
1996, at 5 tbl. C.
14. See National Research Council, supra note 12, at 95.
15. [d.
16. See Schmidley & Alvarado, supra note 10.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at tbls.
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the earlier era of mass immigration, account for only about
twenty percent of the nation's foreign-born population in 1997.20
c. Labor Force
As the immigrant population is younger than the native-born
population and contains more men, than women, the impact of
immigration on the labor force is significantly greater than the
population statistics reveal. In 1997, foreign-born workers
accounted for 11.5% of the labor force, or almost one of every
eight U.S. workers.21 Even this high percentage must be viewed
as a minimal figure because of the undercount of illegal
immigrant workers.
As in the past, a key feature of the post-1965 mass
immigration has been its geographic concentration. In 1997, five
states (California, New York, Florida, Texas, and Illinois)
accounted for sixty-five percent of the entire foreign-born
population and sixty-six percent of the entire foreign-born labor
force.22 The foreign-born are also overwhelmingly concentrated in
only a handful of urban areas-especially in their central cities.
These particular labor markets, however, are among the nation's
largest in size: Los Angeles, New York, San. Francisco, Miami,
and Chicago.23 Collectively, these five cities accounted for fifty-
one percent of all foreign-born workers.24
The most significant labor market characteristic of the
current foreign-born labor work force is the fact that workers
with little human capital disproportionately characterize the
work force. The 1990 Census revealed that the twenty-five
percent of foreign-born adults who were twenty-five years and
older had less than a ninth-grade education compared with only
ten percent of native-born adults. Moreover, forty-two percent of
the foreign-born adult population did not have the equivalent of a
high school diploma compared to twenty-three percent of the
native-born adult population.25 Thus, it is the low-skilled, low
wage sectors of the nation's major urban labor markets that are
20. See id. at 507.
21. See id. at tbis.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
..
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the most impacted by immigrant job seekers.26 Not only do low-
skilled immigrants compete with each other for whatever
opportunities exist at the bottom of the nation's job hierarchy,
but they also compete with the low-skilled native-born workers
who are disproportionately from minority groups in the nation's
largest urban labor markets.
The effects of the inordinately low human capital attributes
of many immigrants can be seen in their occupational patterns
and unemployment experiences. In 1997, twenty-five percent of
the foreign-born population were employed in the low-skilled
occupations of laborers, farm workers, and operatives while an
additional twenty percent were employed in low-skilled personal
service occupations.27 The unemployment rate of foreign-born
workers in 1997 was 7.4%, whereas the national unemployment
rate was 4.9%.28 The unemployment rate for foreign-born
workers with less than a high school education was 9.8%, and
14.5% for similarly situated native-born workers.29
Consequently, the greatest impact of immigration on the labor
market is in the least skilled segment of the labor force, which is
already having the greatest difficulty finding employment. There
is no shortage of unskilled native-born workers, as indicated by
their inordinately high unemployment rates and by the high
number of illiterate adults in the nation's population (estimated
to exceed 30 million persons).30 .
D. Poverty
As a consequence of the extensive differences in the human
capital characteristics of the native-born and the foreign-born
population, there is a significant variatioIl in the incidence of
poverty between the two groups. In 1997, 13.6% of the nation's
total population was classified as living in poverty.31 For the
foreign-born population, however, 20.9% were living under
26. See Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Income Disparity and Unionism: The Workplace
Influences of Post-1965 Immigration Policy, in THE INEQUALITY PARADOX: GROWTH OF
INCOME DISPARITY 112-32 (James A Auerbach & Richard S. Belous eds. 1998). See also
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 181-85.
27. See Schmidley & Alvarado, supra note 10, at tbIs.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA 4 (1985).
31. See Schmidley & Alavarado, supra note 10, at tbIs.
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poverty conditions compared to 12.9% of the native-born
population.32 Thus, it is not surprising that immigrant families
rely more heavily on the use of both cash and non-cash welfare
programs than do native-born families.33
The inordinately high incidence of poverty among immigrant
families has dire intergenerational consequences on the
preparation of their children to become future workers. It is
estimated that two million immigrant youth enrolled in U.S.
public schools in the decade of the 1980s34 and even more will do
so in the 1990s. Studies of these immigrant children indicate
that they are "almost twice as likely to be poor as compared to all
students, thereby straining local school resources.'~5 Moreover,
"many immigrants, including those of high school age, [] have
had little or no schooling and are illiterate even in their native
languages.,,36 New demands for the creation of bilingual,
programs and special education classes have significantly added
to the costs of urban education and have frequently led to the
diversion of funds from important remedial programs for other
needy children.37 Overcrowding. of urban school systems, already
confronting enormous educational burdens, has frequently
occurred with devastating impacts on the educational process.38
Other educational costs to social policy are subtler but equally as
significant as the financial concerns. Namely, the societal goal of
desegregated urban schools has been greatly retarded by the
arrival of immigrant children because it has increased the racial
isolation of inner city black children.39
32. See id.
33. See GeorgeJ. Bm:jas & Lynette Hilton, Immigration and the Welfare State:
Immigration Participation in Means-Tested Entitlement Programs, 111 Q. J. OF ECON.
575-76 (May 1996); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at ch. 6.
34. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOII'-HEHS-94-146, IMMIGRANT
EDUCATION: FEDERAL FUNDING HAs NOT KEPT PACE WITH STUDENT INCREASES 2 (1994)
(Statement of Linda Morra, Director of Education and Employment Issues, Health
Education and Human Services Division before the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, Immigrants and Schools: The Case of the Big
Apple, 10 F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POLY &4-89 (1995).
38. See, e.g., David Firestone, Crowded Schools in Queens Find Class Space in
Unusual Places, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1994, at AI.
39. See Edward B. Fiske, Racial Shifts Challenge U.S. Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
1988, at A16. See also Jeffrey A. Raffel et al., Policy Dilemmas in Urban Education:
Addressing the Needs of Poor At-risk Children, 14 J. OF URB. AFF. 263 (1992).
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E. Income Inequality
The U.S. Census Bureau pas studied the distribution of
income since 1947. It has reported that from 1947 to 1968 there
was a perceptible decline in family income inequality in the
United States (8. decline of 7.4%).40 This was the era before the
current era of mass immigration commenced. Since 1968,
however, income inequality among families has increased. By
1982, income inequality was back to the same level as it was in
1947 and, by 1994, family income inequality in the nation had
increased by 22.4% over the distribution that existed in 1968.41
It is worthy of note that 1968 was the first year that the policy
changes contained in the Immigration Act of 1965 went into full
effect.
In 1994, the President's Council of Economic Advisers
formally acknowledged in its annual report that "[iJmmigration
has increased the relative supply of less educated labor and
appears to have contributed to the increasing inequality of
income.'~2 Although their report claims that the aggregate effect
"has been small" on the national distribution of income,
immigration is a major factor in the deterioration of wages and
incomes for low-wage and low-income families.43 Such is
especially the case in those urban centers where immigrants
have congregated. Indeed, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in a
1995 study, found that "immigration accounts for approximately
20 to 25 percent of the increase in the wage gap between low- and
high-skill workers during the 1980s in the 50 largest
metropolitan areas of the U.S..,,44 Furthermore, the earlier-
mentioned NRC study of the impact of immigration revealed that
almost half of the decline in real wages for native-born high
school dropouts from 1980-1994 could be attributed to the
adverse competitive impact of unskilled foreign workers.45
Hence, just because the effects of immigration are dissipated
when the perspective is at th~ national level does not mean that
40. See Daniel H. Weinberg, A Brief Look at Postwar U.S. Income Inequality,
CURRENT POPULATION REP P60-191, 1996, at 1.
41. See id.
42. Council of Econ. Advisers, Economic Report of the President 120 (1994).
43. Id.
44. DAVID A. JAEGER, SKILL DIFFERENCES AND THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE
WAGES OF NATIVES 21, (Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper No. 273, 1995).
45. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 227.
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they are insignificant in those local labor markets where mass
immigration is a reality.
F. Labor Mobility
Post-1965 mass immigration has disrupted the internal
migration patterns of native-born workers. Research on labor
mobility has disclosed that the higher the concentration of
immigrants in a local labor market, the less attractive the
locality is to native-born workers.46 Research has also revealed
that foreign-born workers are less likely to move out of states
where they are concentrated than are native-born workers.47
Furthermore, unskilled native-born workers, who are losing out
in the competition for jobs with low-skilled immigrants, are more
likely to leave their former communities to find jobs elsewhere.48
v. THE SAGA OF REFORM
The re-emergence of mass. immigration began as a gradual
process in the late 1960s. But by the late 1970s, its unintended
effects and mass abuse by illegal immigrants had become
sufficiently worrisome for Congress to create a special
commission to study what had unexpectedly happened' and to
recommend policy changes. Known as the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), it was composed of
sixteen members and chaired by a non-politician, the Reverend
Theodore Hesburgh. When SCIRP tendered its final report in
March 1981, it concluded that immigration was "out of control"
and comprehensive reforms were essential.49 Noting that special
interest groups had captured immigration policy, the SCIRP
rejected their myopic appeals to satisfy their private agendas at
the cost of the national interest. Specifically, it stated, "The
Commission has rejected the arguments of many economists,
ethnic groups, and religious leaders for a great expansion in the
"-46. See Robert Walker et aI., Linked Migration Systems: Immigration and Internal
Labor Flows in the United States, 68 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 234-248 (1992).
47. See Mary M. Kritz & June Marie Nogel, Nativity Concentration and Internal
Migration Among the Foreign Born, DEMOGRAPHY, Aug. 1994, at 1-6.
48. See William H. Frey, Immigration and Internal Migration «Flight": A California
Case Study, 16 POPULATION & ENV'T 353-375 (1995).
49. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REF{JGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS BY COMMISSIONERS 5 (Comm. Print 1981).
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number of immigrants and refugees.,,5o Instead it called for a
"cautious approach" in reforming the immigration system and
concluded "this is not the time for a large-scale expansion in legal
immigration. ,,51
Congress did not respond to SCIRP's recommendations for
changes in the legal immigration system, but ultimately passed
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)52 to
address the issue of illegal immigration. IRCA included a
generous amnesty program that permitted 2.7 million illegal
immigrants to adjust their status to become permanent resident
aliens and established a system of workplace sanctions to
prevent employers from hiring illegal immigrants. The hope was
to deter new illegal entries in the future. Unfortunately, the
sanctions system was full of loopholes and all of IRCA's
deterrence measures were poorly funded. Hence, illegal
immigration continues to flourish, despite IRCA's worthwhile
legislative intentions.
In 1990, Congress, in direct contradiction of SCIRP's earlier
recommendation, dramatically increased the scale of legal
immigration. The Immigration Act of 199053 raised annual
admissions by thirty-five percent over the level in place since
1965. It also significantly eased the access of U.S. employers to
foreign workers who can be hired to work in the country
"temporarily" as non-immigrant workers.54
To monitor the impact of the 1990 legislation, Congress
created the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR). It
was a nine-member commission, chaired, from 1993 until her
death in January 1996, by Barbara Jordan, a former member of
Congress who became a professor of public policy. CIR's final
report was released on September 30, 1997, but it was preceded
by the release of a series of interim reports. 55 CIR identified
50. [d. at 7.
51. [d. at 8.
52. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
V.S.C.).
53. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 V.S.C.).
54. 8 VB.C. §§ 204-09, 221.
55. See V.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN:
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY, (1997). See also the interim reports: V.S. COMM'N
ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETIING PRIORITIES (1996); V.S. COMM'N
ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, V.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDIB1LITY (1994).
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illegal immigration as the "most immediate need" for policy
attention.56 Among its recommendations was a call for a
significant expansion in the size of the U.S. Border Patrol, the
construction of new physical barriers, a system to validate the
authenticity of social security cards (which are used to establish
eligibility for employment), and steps to reduce access to "breeder
documents" (e.g., birth certificates) used to obtain other
documents (e.g., social security cards and driver's licenses).
With regard to legal immigration, CIR recommended: (i)
reverting to the pre-1990 admission levels, (ii) eliminating
extended family preferences, (iii) eliminating the category that
permits unskilled workers to be admitted, (iv) eliminating the
"diversity immigrant" admission category, and (v) including
refugees within the total number of immigrants that are to be
admitted each year.57
During the course of its deliberations, CIR requested, in
1995, that the National Research Council (NRC) of the National
Academy of Sciences convene a panel of experts to independently
assess the economic and. demographic consequences of
immigration. Agreeing to do so, the NRC released its report in
1997. With regard to its demographic findings, as noted earlier,
its "intermediate projection" indicated that immigration would
account for two-thirds of the population growth that will occur in
the United States by the year 2050.58 As for their economic
findings, the NRC report catalogued the fact that the educational
attainment levels of post-1965 immigrants have steadily
declined.59 Consequently, foreign-born workers, on average, earn
less than native-born workers and the earnings gap between
them has widened over the years.6o Those from Latin America,
which presently accounts for over half of the entire foreign-born
population of the nation, earn the lowest wages.61 The NRC,
however, found no evidence of discriminatory wages being paid to
immigrants. 62 Rather, it found that immigrant workers are paid
~
56. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING
CREDIBILITY 3 (1994).
57. Since 1980, refugees and asylum applicants have been admitted outside of the
ceilings imposed by the nation's immigration law.
58. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 95.
59. See id. at 185-90.
60. See id. at 181-85.
61. See id. at 181, 235.
62. See id. at 181.
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less than native-born workers because, in fact, they are less
skilled and less educated.63 The relative declines in both skills
and wages of the foreign-born population were attributed to the
fact that most immigrants are coming from the poorer nations of
the world, where the average education, wages, and skill levels
are far below those in the United States.64 As a direct
consequence, post-1965 immigrants are disproportionately
increasing the segment of the nation's labor supply that has the
lowest human capital endowments.65 In the process, they are
lowering the wages of ~11 workers in the lowest skill sector of the
labor market.66 The chief beneficiaries of immigration are the
immigrant workers themselves whose wages are usually
considerably higher than if they had stayed in their homelands.67
The NRC did find that there was a net "benefit" of
immigration to the nation's labor market each year of $1 to $10
billion.68 This measure, however, is a benefit that only an
economist could appreciate. Namely, the benefits to the economy
are largely the result of the suppression of the wages of workers
who compete with the immigrant inflow that causes lower prices
of goods and services for the economy. These suppressed wages
are mostly those of low-skilled workers with low incomes, but
they are also the wages of workers at the other end of the skills
spectrum-those in some professional and technical occupations
that have also had a disproportionate increase in immigrant and
non-immigrant "temporary" workers. It is unlikely that any of
these workers consider this artificial manipulation by the
government of the size of their labor supply to be a "benefit."
Likewise, where there are economic benefits, there are
always economic costs. In this case, the NRC calculated the net
fiscal costs of public services to immigrants (e.g., those associated
with increased education, medical, welfare, incarceration, and
public housing) to range from $14.8 to $20.2 billion a year.69
Obviously, these fiscal costs are disproportionately distributed
among the communities and states depending on the size of the
foreign-born population in 'their respective jurisdictions. In
63. See id.
64. See id. at 235-36.
65. See id. at 236.
66. See id. at 236.
67. See id. at 181.
68. See id. at 153.
69. See id. at 293.
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California, for example, in excess of the taxes paid by
immigrants, it costs every native-born household $1,178 a year in
added taxes to cover the costs of government services provided to
. . t 70lmmlgran s.
Meanwhile, in response to CIR's interim reports and in
anticipation of what its final report would say in 1997, Congress
made a preemptive move in 1996, and once more took up
immigration reform. But with a host of special interest groups
fighting every proposed change, opponents of reform were able to
kill all proposals pertaining to legal immigration and refugee
limitations. The watered-down legislation that passed in 1996
did increase funding for deterrence measures against illegal
immigration, but it failed to include the most important means
needed to curb the abuse-the creation of a viable verification
system for work eligibility in the United States.
Subsequently, when the NRC published its thorough
research findings in May 1997, and when the CIR, after six years
of intense work, issued its comprehensive final report in
September 1997, they were both met by non-interest by the
media and policy makers. By this time, the pro-immigration
lobby had won the day and the pursuit of the national interest
had once again been thwarted.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In assessing the latest political debacle of the immigration
reform movement in the mid-1990s, political scientists James
Gimpel and James Edwards wrote, "The voice of the people has
had little impact on the tone or direction of the immigration
debate in Washington."71 They point out that despite the
extensive research findings that show the need for significant
legislative changes and the public opinion polls that consistently
show that the citizenry wants these changes to take place, it
makes no difference to the professional politicians.72 Immigration
policy' has been captured by an unholy alliance that links
religious organizations, ethnic groups, libertarian economists,
70. See id. at 287.
71. James G. Gimpel & James R. Edwards, Jr., The Silent Majority, J. OF COM.,
June 23, 1998, at 8A.
72. See id.
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and the powerful American Immigration Lawyers Association,
who all have self interests and financial interests in maintaining
the status quo, with corporate America which has a vested
interests in cheap labor policies.
Immigration reform is not going to go away. The issue
continues to fester. For as George Borjas and Richard Freeman,
the key authors. of the labor market portion of the NRC report,
have subsequently written in response to the gross distortions of
their work by the pro-immigration lobby and the media:
. Immigration creates winners and losers. Low-income
workers and taxpayers in immigrant states lose; those who
employ immigrants or use immigrant services win, as do the
immigrants themselves. The critical issue is how much do we
care about the well being of immigrants compared with that of
the Americans who win and the Americans who lose.73
For the time being, it would seem that policymakers are not
concerned with the wage and income inequities or the labor
market distortions that are the product of the nation's extant
immigration policies. They are totally oblivious to its long-term
demographic implications. But, as the NRC report made
abundantly clear, immigration is not a free lunch. Eventually as
the costs of immigration continue to mount and as the change-
creating power of immigration policy continues to reshape the
nation's destiny, this rogue element of public policy will be
reined-in. The sooner that day comes, the better off the nation
will be.
73. George J. Borjas & Richard B. Freeman, Findings We Never Found, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1997, at A29.
